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Experimentally observed deviations of behavior from game theoretic predictions suggest that fairness 
does influence decision making. Fairness in the sense of equality has become an essential element of 
economic models aiming at explaining actual behavior (cf. Fehr/Schmidt 1999, Bolton/Ockenfels 
2000). In this paper I will argue that equality is not the only fairness norm to be taken into account. 
Conditional on the game subjects are playing there may be more equity norms than equality, including 
inequality of payoffs. Since inequitable payoff allocations are advantageous for one player and disad-
vantageous for the other, opponents may suffer from a self-serving bias in fairness judgments making 
an agreement impossible. Subjects in the stronger position may exhibit equality aversion whereas play-
ers in the weaker position show inequality aversion. 
 
Drawing on experimental results using the video method (Hennig-Schmidt 1999) I further show that in 
a bargaining experiment behavior is goal-oriented; fairness criteria based on equity norms are reference 
points that influence the decision process which finally leads to observed outcomes.  
 
I analyze video experiments of the ultimatum game (Güth/Schmidtberger/Schwarze 1982; S a-
drieh/Osterholt 1998), the tripled take game (Sadrieh/Hennig-Schmidt 1999), and an alternating offer 
bargaining game (Selten 1981; Hennig-Schmidt 1999).  
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1. Introduction  
 
Fairness in the sense of equality is an essential element of economic models that aim at ex-
plaining observed behavior in experiments which deviates from game theoretic predictions. 
Two examples of recent m odels taking into account interpersonal motivations are 
Fehr/Schmidt (1999) and Bolton/Ockenfels (2000). Fehr/Schmidt’s model rests on the postu-
late of inequality aversion. Utility is dependent on the player’s own payoff and on the differ-
ence between players’ payoffs; deviations from equality play a crucial role in this model. The 
premise in Bolton/Ockenfels’ model is that together with the absolute payoff the relative pay-
off motivates people. The authors stress that equal division has collective significance; it is 
referred to as the social reference point. 
 
In this paper I will argue that equality is not the only fairness norm to be taken into account. 
Conditional on the game subjects are playing there may be more equity norms than equality, 
including inequality of payoffs. Since inequitable payoff allocations are advantageous for one 
player and disadvantageous for the other, opponents may adhere to different fairness norms 
making an agreement impossible. Subjects in the stronger position may exhibit equality aver-
sion whereas players in the weaker position show inequality aversion. 
 
A second purpose of my paper is to describe how actual behavior is influenced by fairness 
norms. Drawing on experimental results using the strategy and the video method (cf. Sel-
ten/Mitzkewitz/Uhlig 1997, Hennig-Schmidt 1999) I will criticize the optimization approach 
dominant in modern economic modeling. Analyzing a bargaining experiment I will show that 
behavior is goal-oriented; fairness criteria based on equity norms are reference points that in-
fluence the decision process which finally leads to observed outcomes.  
 
In this paper I analyze three experiments in which one or more fairness norms may prevail. 
Subjects’ task is to agree on the allocation of a sum of money. The method I use to support my 
argumentation is the video method which gives valuable information in addition to what com-
puter or paper and pencil experiments are able to yield and which can hardly be obtained by 
another method The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 experimental method and de-
sign are explained, in section 3 I describe the games played in the experiments. In section 4 
results are stated with regard to the existence of different fairness norms and their influence 
on decision behavior. In the final section 5 I conclude. 
 
 
2. Method and Experimental Design 
 
Computer-, paper-and-pencil experiments and questionnaire studies usually document only 
decisions. The video method which was introduced by Hennig-Schmidt (1999) has the advan-
tage that the process of decision making can be made visible by having subjects play together 
in a group. They have to solve a common task and the in-group discussions of their decisions 
are video taped. These are transcribed word for word into text protocols. The transcripts and 
the video tapes are the basis for evaluation.  
 
Since subjects act together in groups they argue spontaneously. By recording these discussions 
the video method allows to gain non-numerical behavioral data which are relevant in many 
experiments and which often are incompletely reflected in the final outcomes, if at all. For our 
analysis the discussions of different notions of fairness are important. Subjects are not explic-
itly asked for their fairness perception because we did not want to draw their attention to this 
point of our interest.   
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I analyze video experiments of a one-shot ultimatum game – UG – (Güth/Schmidtberger/-
Schwarze 1982; Sadrieh/Osterholt 1998), a one-shot tripled take game – TTG – (Sadrieh/-
Hennig-Schmidt 1999), and an alternating offer bargaining game – BG – (Selten 1981; Hen-
nig-Schmidt 1999). All games are two-player games between players A and B. Except for the 
bargaining experiment the  strategy method (Selten 1967) has been applied where players 
have to report a decision for every possible allocation. We wanted to force players to discuss 
all possible allocations in order to have a chance of detecting characterizations of different 
fairness notions. Players have been fully informed on all features of the experimental design. 
There was no face-to-face contact between the groups, only the decisions have been transmit-




3. Experiments  
 
3.1 The Ultimatum Game  
 
In the UG video experiment player A is endowed with 10 units of money which he can allo-
cate between himself and player B who has an endowment of 0. A decides on the amount 
x˛{0,...,10} to be sent to player B. Simultaneously and independently player B decides on an 
acceptance limit y˛{0,...,10} for the amount x she is willing to accept. For x‡y A receives the 
payoff 10–x, and B receives x. For x<y both receive nothing. 
 
The game theoretic solution of this game is that B accepts any amount A can send her since 
she is equally well or worse off when rejecting. Thus x=0 and y=0 is the only equilibrium 
point in strictly undominated strategies. 
 
3.2 The Tripled Take Game  
 
In the TTG video experiment player B is endowed with 12 monetary units, player A has an 
endowment of 0. B decides on an acceptance limit y˛{0,...,12} for the amount x which A can 
take away from her. Simultaneously and independently player A is deciding on the amount 
x˛{0,...,12} he is taking away from B. For x£y B receives the payoff 12–x, and A receives 
3x. For x>y both receive nothing. 
 
The game theoretic solution of this game is that A takes away all the money from B and B ac-
cepts this since she is equally well off when rejecting. Thus y=12 and x=12 is the only equi-
librium point in strictly undominated strategies. 
 
3.3 An Alternating Offer Bargaining Game 
 
The game played in this video experiment is a two-person characteristic function game. It 
comprises a situation where two players A and B anonymously bargain on the distribution of 
a given amount of money, the coalition value v(AB), by alternating offers without time limit 
and no bargaining costs. If they agree on an allocation they receive the amounts they agreed 
upon. If they do not reach an agreement they receive a conflict payoff v(A) resp. v(B), with 
v(A)>v(B), and  v(A)+v(B)=v(AB)/2. The values are  v(AB)=320,  v(A)=128 resp. 96, 
v(B)=32 resp. 64. 
 
There is no unique game theoretic solution for this game. No disagreement should occur be-
cause players are equally well or worse off if they reject an offer equal or larger than the con-
flict payoff.    
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4. Results  
 
A first result of the video experiments is that behavior does not correspond to the game theo-
retic solutions of section 3. From Table 1 we see that the average x’s of players A and the av-
erage y’s of players B are far from game theoretic predictions. Moreover, there is a consider-
able percentage of disagreements
1.  
 
Table 1: Outcomes in different video experiments 
 

















Ultimatum    9  4,44  2,44    56  0.22 
Tripled Take  12  6,50  7,92      8  0.33 
Bargaining  20      175,89
1)    8  0.20 
 
1) including disagreement payoffs 
 
Session outcomes are shown in Figures 1 – 3 (see Appendix). 
 
 
4.1 Fairness is synonymous to equity 
 
The first goal of this paper is to uncover allocations that players characterized as fair. I hy-
pothesize that subjects perceive also allocations as fair that are different from the equal split.  
 
Table 2: Fairness norms, distribution masses, distribution keys, and payoffs of allocations 
characterized as fair in different video experiments 
 
Game  Fairness  Distribution  Distribution  Payoff 
  norm  mass  key  Player A  Player B 
Ultimatum  - Equal Split of en-
dowment 
- endowment  - egalitarian  5  5 
Tripled Take  - Equality of payoffs  - joint payoff  - egalitarian  9  9 
  - Equal Split of en-
dowment player B 
- endowment 
player B 
- egalitarian  18  6 
Bargaining  - Equal Split (ES)  - coalition value  - egalitarian  160  160 
  - Proportional Split 
(P) 
- coalition value  - proportional to 
conflict payoff 
256 (192)  64 (128) 
  - Split the Difference 
(SD) 
- coalition value 
minus sum of 
conflict payoffs 
- egalitarian  208 (176)  112 (144) 
  - Equal Split of dif-
ference between SD 
and ES (ESSD) 
- (SD-ES)  - egalitarian  184 (168)  136 (152) 














                                                 
1Roth (1995) reports on the same phenomenon in other experiments.     
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Irrespective of final agreements with very few exceptions fairness is attributed to equitable 
allocations the common property of which is the equity principle (Selten 1978, 1987), a con-
cept of great importance in distributive negotiations: An amount of money (e.g. rewards or 
costs) is to be divided equally. Yet, what is meant by equal - the way to assign weights to 
each player, i.e. the distribution key - and the way to measure the amount to be distributed - 
i.e. the distribution mass - is not unambiguous.  
 
Table 2 shows the allocations participants stated as fair at least once in a session. They differ 
with respect to the distribution mass and/or the distribution key. They are not only described 
as fair, but are also indicated by their equality characteristic
2. Apart from UG more than one 
norm has been identified as fair. Depending on the norm rather unequal payoffs for both play-
ers result (cf. Table 2 and Figures 4 – 6 in the Appendix). 
 
In addition to knowing which fairness norms were identified it is also important to know  how 
frequently these norms were brought up. Table 3 shows two regularities: the existence of a 
self-serving bias with regard to fairness norms and a seeming preference for the equal split 
over other equity norms. 
 
a)  Self-serving bias 
 
The existence of a self-serving bias with regard to fairness norms was already shown in early 
experiments. The perception of fairness seems to be role-specific. If multiple rules of fairness 
are available subjects do utilize them to their benefit (cf. Komorita/Kravitz 1979, 
McClintock/Kramer/Keil 1984). This view is confirmed in later research (Babcock et al. 
1995, Babcock/Loewenstein 1997, Hennig-Schmidt 1999, Gächter/Riedl 2000)
3.  
 
A clear pattern of self-serving bias in our experiments is displayed in Table 3
4: the respective 
more profitable fairness norm is mentioned more often by the advantaged player than by the 
disadvantaged one. For instance in TTG 83% of players B term equality of payoffs fair 
against only 75 % of players A. For equitable payoffs that give more to players A than to 
players B the opposite is the case: in TTG only 17% of players B identify these allocations as 
fair against 50 % of players A; the same tendency holds for BG. And even in UG where there 
is just one fairness norm only 78% of players A call the equal split a fair division against 
100% of players B.  
 
This point was extensively discussed as the following quotes from BG show: One B-player 
group reasoned that “the proportional split might the ‘equal split’ for the A-group as the equal 
split is the ‘equal split’ for us”. An A-group debated the different fairness norms in the fol-
lowing way: “Split the difference is one fairness definition, equal split is another. The pro-
portional split is a third one which also has to be included. Our perception of fairness is split 
the difference, their idea of fairness is the equal split. This would also be ours if we were in a 
group B position”. 
                                                 
2 and as ”appropriate, best, equilibrium allocations, ideal, logical, normal, optimal, rational, reasonable, so-
cial”. 
3 See also Königstein (2000). 
4 We did not find significant differences between A- and B-players. Yet, we have to be careful when running 
statistical analyses on fairness characterizations since the independence postulate is not met in 2 respects: 
Fairness characterizations are not independent observations because many groups stated more than one fair-
ness norm which might be interrelated. In the bargaining game experienced and inexperienced groups are in-
cluded in our analysis.      
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Table 3: Frequency of fairness characterizations 
 
Game  Fairness norm  Players A 
% of groups 
Players B 
% of groups 
Ultimatum  - Equal Split of endowment  78  100 
Tripled Take  - Equality of payoffs  75   83 
  - Equal Split of endowment player B  50   17 
Bargaining  - Equal Split (ES)  65   75 
  - Proportional Split (P)  15    5 
  - Split the Difference (SD)  25   15 
  - Equal Split of difference between 
SD and ES (ESSD) 
10    5 
  - Equal Split of difference between 
proposals of bargainers 
35   30 
 
 
b)  Preference for the equal split over other equity norms?  
 
The Equal split is the allocation being characterized as fair most frequently by players B and 
A. This result seems to support the models quoted above claiming that equal division is the 
social reference point and inequality aversion has significance for both players. From the 
knowledge of the video transcript I argue that there are two kinds of aversion: most players A 
exhibit equality aversion, whereas players B exhibit inequality aversion.  
 
All players, A and B, are aware of the fact that equal division is a very strong fairness norm, 
yet, possibly one among others. Players A know that the equal split might be the fairness norm 
for players B and they discuss this frequently (see the above quotation). These discussions are 
included in the figures of Table 3. The transcripts clearly reveal that most players A want 
more than the equal split. This is also confirmed by Table 1 and Figures 1 – 3. The percent-
age of players A finally offering less than the equal split is substantial: in TTG 92%, (11 out 
of 12), in BG 92% (18 out of 20) and even in UG - where only one fairness norm exists - 44% 
(4 out of 9). In BG players could make more than one offer and here the tendency to equality 
aversion is even more obvious: less than 1 % of all player A proposals have been the equal 
split. In fact only in 2 sessions players agreed on equality of payoffs, and here the same A-
group was involved playing as an inexperienced and an experienced group. 
 
B-players are the ones that show inequality aversion from a fairness point of view. Even 
though with one exception acceptance levels in UG and TTG involve payoffs less than the 
equal split (Figures 1a, 2a in the Appendix) fairness statements are clearly in favor of payoff 
equality (cf. Table 3). Moreover, in BG 49% of all player B proposals have been the equal 
split or even less showing that players B negotiated hard to avoid unequal payoffs. 
 
The impact of the multiplicity of fairness norms on decision m aking is important in two re-
spects: First, in games where only one fairness norm exists players A offer the equal split sig-
nificantly more often than in games with several fairness norms (p < 0.05). This result sug-
gests that  when analyzing distributive tasks one has to account for multiplicity of fairness 
norms. Second, even if the percentage of players perceiving non-equal payoffs as fair is rather 
small (cf. Table 3) this might nevertheless be important with respect to bargaining impasse. If 
players adhere to different fairness norms consent between them might become difficult, the 
self-serving bias in fairness judgments may prevent agreement. And indeed, the transcripts 
suggest that disagreements occur because opponents’ aspirations are incompatible. They are 
anchored at different fairness norms and players are not willing to make sufficient conces-   
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sions. Babcock and Loewenstein in their survey article (1997) report on investigations show-
ing the same phenomenon. I will discuss this point further in section 4.2. 
 
I conclude the discussion in this section by formulating the following results: 
 
Result 1: Fair allocations are equitable allocations. 
 
Result 2: A multiplicity of fairness norms exist. Even in one game different fairness con-
cepts may prevail. 
 
Result 3: Because of the self-serving bias in fairness judgments inequality and equality 
aversion exists.  
 
 
4.2 The influence of fairness on decision making 
 
In the remainder of the paper I will analyze how actual behavior is influenced by fairness 
norms. The example I take is the alternating offer bargaining game (cf. Hennig-Schmidt 1999). 
 
The analysis of the transcripts shows that subjects’ decision behavior is clearly  goal-
oriented. In contrast to the main tendency in economic model building no attempt of subjects 
to optimize could be found in the transcripts.
5 Instead, they very early in the bargaining proc-
ess formulate aspirations on the final payoff they want to achieve; these aspiration levels are 
adapted during the bargaining process. 
 
Do fairness norms have an influence on the formation and adaptation of aspiration levels? 
This question can usually not be answered by computer experiments since aspiration levels 
are not directly observable from decisions. The video taped discussions, however, show a 
surprising fact: the equity principle and the prominence principle can explain formations and 
adaptations of aspiration levels in all groups except in 6 cases (cf. Table 4). It was shown be-
fore that fairness is attributed to equitable allocations. Therefore in the following I will ne-
glect prominence
6 and concentrate on the influence of the equity principle on the decision-
making process. 
 
How do subjects form the first aspiration level in the negotiation? Table 4 shows that the ma-
jority of groups are oriented towards social norms. In 36 groups one of the fairness norms is a 
guideline for constructing the first aspiration level, in 4 out of the 36 in combination with the 
prominence principle. We also see the divergence between A- and B-groups: 12 of the 16 B-
groups that are solely oriented towards the equity principle take the Equal Split as their focal 
point in comparison to only 3 A-groups. But also aspiration adaptation is guided by the equity 
principle (cf. Table 4). Aspiration levels are adapted to another social norm, or they are ad-
justed in a way that evenly splits the bargaining area determined by aspiration levels or de-
mands of both groups. 
 
I now return to the multiplicity of fairness norms and the impact of the self-serving bias on 
disagreements. In 4 sessions no agreement is reached (sessions where payoffs < 160 in Figure 
3). All A-players’ aspiration levels are guided by a fairness norm giving highly unequal pay-
offs to the groups – proportional split and split the difference (cf. Table 5). B-players start the  
                                                 
5 This finding is in accordance with the results of Selten/Mitzkewitz/Uhlig (1997) who in a strategy experi-
ment also found no optimizing behavior. 
6See Hennig-Schmidt (1999) for a detailed analysis.    
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Table 4: Principles of formation and adaptation of aspiration levels 
 
Aspiration Levels  Number of A-groups 
(Total = 20) 
Number of B-groups 
(Total = 20) 
Formation of aspiration levels     
Equity Principle  16  16 
Equal Split  3  12 
> Equal Split
7  8  2 
Split the Difference  2  1 
Proportional Split (P); <P  1  1 
Middle between demands/ingroup-proposals  2   
Prominence Principle  2  1 
Equity and Prominence Principle  2  2 
Other    1 
Adaptation of aspiration levels     
Equity Principle  12  15 
Prominence Principle  15  16 
Equity and Prominence Principle  8  5 
Other  4  1 
 
negotiation with an initial aspiration level being anchored at the equal split or split the differ-
ence. In the final stage of the negotiation they favor allocations much lower than A-players 
equity anchored aspirations. Although two B-groups offer a fair distribution opponents’ fair-
ness notions do not concur. There is no inclination to further concessions on both sides. The 
result is a break-down of the negotiation.  
 
Table 5: Diverging aspirations of players A and B in disagreement sessions 
 
           Player A 
 
Player B   Disagree-
ment ses-
sion  Fairness norm guiding fi-
nal aspiration level  
Payoff  Fairness norm guiding low-
est (initial) aspiration level  
Highest( in-
tended) offer  
1  Split the Difference   208  (Equal Split)  (190) 
2  Proportional Split  
and prominence principle 
240  (> Equal Split)  200 
3  Proportional Split  
and prominence principle 
200  > Equal Split  160 
4  Proportional Split  
and prominence principle 
259  Split the Difference   (208) 
 
                                                 
7 If a group does not want to accept an upper or lower offer this is treated as a separate aspiration level, even 
though it does not correspond to the notion of a level. However, the formulations in the transcripts were un-
ambiguous that the value taken as a reference point should not be accepted even though a specific amount was 
not yet mentioned.    
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Our result concerning the influence of the self-serving bias of fairness norms is not as clear-
cut as those by Loewenstein/Thompson/Bazerman (1989) where negotiators are strongly ad-
verse to settling even slightly below the point they view as fair. One reason for the difference 
in results might be that we did not ask subjects beforehand on their fairness notion and there-
fore did not attract their attention to this point. Therefore they cannot stick to a previously de-
clared fairness statement This may result in some groups being willing to make concessions 
far below their initial aspiration level. Nevertheless, in the disagreement groups we see con-
siderable divergence between fairness norms resp. demands and offers 
 
Result 4: Aspiration formation and adaptation are  determined by fairness norms. Self-





In this paper I showed that different fairness norms exist even in one game, and that fairness 
norms differ across games. Fairness perceptions coincide with the different appearances of 
the equity principle. Depending on their role in the game players show equality and inequality 
aversion. Therefore, it seems to be problematic to design general models that are based on 
one specific fairness concept only as an explaining factor for behavior. This is the more the 
case since the self-serving bias in fairness perceptions induces players to be guided by op-
posed fairness norms and thus may impede agreement.  
 
The impact of fairness on decision making was demonstrated in the case of the bargaining 
game. No attempt of subjects to optimize could be found in the transcripts. Instead, subjects’ 
exhibit goal-directed behavior. Fairness in the sense of equity is the guiding principle in aspi-
ration formation and plays an important role in aspiration adaptation. There is evidence that in 
UG and TTG fairness norm(s) being perceived as valid in the respective situation functions as 
a focal point which serves as a point of orientation for estimating the opponent’s acceptance 
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